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1 Introduction
The permanent integration into regular employment is the primary purpose of active labour market
policy (ALMP) in Germany. To achieve this goal, the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) spends
substantial amounts on measures like vocational training programmes (VT), job creation schemes
(JCS) and special promotion for disabled people and aspirants for vocational rehabilitation. ALMP
was first introduced in Germany in the late 1960s. Since then, the labour market experienced several
important changes, caused by the oil price shocks during the 1970s and the growth of the labour
market after the German Re-Unification in 1990. The set of programmes was gradually adjusted to
these changes. Despite these reforms and large spending on ALMP, the German labour market is
still plagued by high and persistent unemployment. Therefore, evaluating ALMP has become a major
topic and was also legally anchored in the reformed legal basis for ALMP in 1998 (Social Code III).
The main question to be answered is, if programmes improve the employment chances of participants.
In this paper we evaluate the effects of JCS for the participating individuals. JCS, which have been
one major element of ALMP in Germany over the last years, are a form of subsidised employment
and aim at the stabilisation and qualification of unemployed persons with disadvantages on the labour
market. The main purpose of these programmes is the (re-) integration of unemployed persons into the
first labour market.1 Recent empirical studies of JCS for Germany have shown that the average effects
for the participating individuals are negative (see for example Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004)).2
The reasons for these findings have to be analysed. One possible explanation may be the poor quality of
programmes in conjunction with often cited stigma- and ‘locking-in’-effects. But leaving this argument
aside for a moment, the results may also come from inefficient allocation mechanisms. The central
motivation in this context is that programme impacts are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and 2000)
and therefore negative average effects may not apply for all strata of the population. As Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999) point out, negative mean impacts may be acceptable if most participants
benefit from participation. Abandoning the ‘common effect’ assumption of treatment effects and
identifying the individuals who gain from the programmes is an obvious opportunity to improve their
future efficiency. If we are able to identify the personal characteristics which are responsible for the
1 Other purposes of JCS, for example the relief of the stock of unemployed in regions with great imbalances of the
labour market, are secondary only and will not be evaluated here.
2 This is also a common finding in the recent evaluation literature of ALMP programmes in Europe. Whereas ALMP
were seen as a reasonable opportunity to reduce and avoid unemployment for a long time, the international experiences
with the implemented programmes show a mixed picture. The majority of programmes seem to be ineffective in terms of
their goals. As the overviews by Martin and Grubb (2001) for OECD countries and Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstro¨m
(2002) for Sweden clarify, ALMP are in their present design and implementation not able to achieve a lasting reduction
of unemployment.
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effect heterogeneity in individual impacts, we can use this knowledge for a better future allocation of
individuals to programmes. A good example is a situation where we find e.g. that a certain programme
works for older participants but does not work for younger participants at all. If in the past more
younger individuals have been allocated to the programme, the average effect of the programme may
have been negative. Knowing the sources of effect heterogeneity would have helped to achieve a better
allocation.
Our evaluation focuses on two main issues: First, we analyse if individuals gain on average from
participation. To do so, we use matching methods to estimate the average treatment effect on the
treated. Thereby we take gender-specific and regional differences into account. Since the average effects
may not apply to all strata of the population, we examine different sources of effect heterogeneity in
a second step. We start with a selection of special problem-groups of the labour market like long-
term unemployed or individuals without professional training and estimate their treatment effects
separately. After that, we construct a simple indicator, which we call target score, based on the
individual’s number of disadvantages on the labour market, to analyse whether programme effects
differ corresponding to the individual labour market hindrances. If programmes are tailored to the
needs of the most-disadvantaged, one would expect stronger effects for persons with a higher target
score. Finally, we use the estimated participation probability to answer the question, whether a higher
participation probability correlates with a higher programme effect. We use data on participants
who started their JCS programme in February 2000, and on a comparison group of nonparticipants
who were eligible for participation at the end of January 2000, but did not participate in February.
We observe the employment status of our sample until December 2002, i.e. almost three years after
programmes have started.
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section we briefly review some stylised facts of
ALMP and JCS in Germany. We present the data used in section three and introduce the econometric
methodology in section four. In section five we discuss the results for the main population. After that,
we present the results of the target approaches. Finally, section seven concludes.
2 Some Stylised Facts of Active Labour Market Policy and Job
Creation Schemes in Germany
The legal basis for ALMP in Germany is the Social Code III. ALMP are part of the employment
promotion and primarily aim at the permanent (re-)integration of unemployed persons into regular
employment. According to Social Code III, employment promotion should help to achieve the balanc-
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ing of labour demand and supply. Therefore, unemployment should be circumvented by an efficient
filling of vacancies and the increase of the individual employment chances due to an upgrade of the
worker’s human capital. Although ALMP have a long tradition in Germany, their importance increased
after the German Re-Unification in 1990. Especially in the eastern part, ALMP were implemented on
a large scale to cushion the strong employment reduction in the first years of the transition process.
During the last decade two major instruments characterised German ALMP: First, VT programmes
that aim at a qualification transfer to circumvent and solve structural problems on the labour market.
Second, JCS whose main purpose is to stabilise and qualify unemployed workers for later re-integration
into regular employment, but which are also used to relieve tense labour market situations in regions
with high unemployment rates.
Promotion of JCS3 can be authorised if they support activities which are of value for society and
additional in nature. Furthermore, individuals have to be placed, whose last chance to stabilise and
qualify for later re-integration into regular employment is participation in these schemes. Additional
in nature means that the activities could not be executed without the subsidy. Measures with a
predominantly commercial purpose have been excluded explicitly up to January 2002. The majority
of activities is conducted in the public and non-commercial sector. Financial support for JCS is
obtained as a wage subsidy to the employer. Even though JCS should be co-financed measures
where between 30 and 75 percent of the costs are subsidies by the FEA and the rest is paid by the
supporting institution, exceptions can be made in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100
percent). The legal requirements for individuals to enter JCS are relaxed by the Social Code III
amendment (Job-AQTIV-Gesetz) in January 2002. Before that time, potential participants had to
be long-term unemployed (more than one year) or unemployed for at least six months within the last
twelve months. Furthermore, they had to fulfil the conditions for the entitlement of unemployment
compensation. In addition, the local placement officers were allowed to place up to five percent of the
allocated individuals who did not meet these conditions (Five-Percent-Quota). Further exceptions are
made for young unemployed (under 25 years) without professional training, short-term unemployed
(with at least three months of unemployment) placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised
or qualified.4 The subsidy is in general paid for 12 months, but may be extended up to 24 months
3 The legal basis for JCS is §§ 260–271, 416 Social Code III. They have been the second most important instrument
of ALMP in Germany in respect of the fiscal volume and the number of promoted individuals. For 2002 the number
of promoted individuals in JCS amounts to 112,462 in East and 52,229 in West Germany. These figures correspond to
spendings from 1,639.5 million euro in East and 693.5 million euro in West Germany.
4 With the 2002 amendment, unemployed individuals whose only occupation opportunity is participation in JCS can
be placed in programmes independently of the preceding unemployment duration. In addition, the Five-Percent-Quota
was augmented up to ten percent.
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or even 36 months under special circumstances. Participants are allowed to do a practical training
up to 40 percent of the time and a VT up to 20 percent, together no more than 50 percent of the
programme duration. Priority should be given to projects which enhance the chances for permanent
jobs, support structural improvement in social or environmental services or aim at the integration of
extremely hard-to-place individuals. Participation in JCS results from placement by the local labour
office. Unemployed individuals who cannot be integrated into regular employment or do not fit the
conditions for another instrument of ALMP may be offered a place. The responsible caseworker may
cancel a running programme at any time if the participant can be placed into regular employment.
If an unemployed person rejects the JCS offer or if a participant denies a career counselling by the
placement officer, the labour office can stop the payment of unemployment benefits for up to twelve
weeks.
3 Data Set
The data used for the empirical analysis contain information on all participants who were placed in a
JCS in February 2000, and on a comparison group of nonparticipants who were eligible for participation
in January 2000, but did not enter those schemes in February. Information on nonparticipants and
participants were merged from several sources of the FEA. Central source for the information derived
on participants is a prototype version of the programme participants master data set (‘Maßnahme-
Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei’, MTG). This data set includes information from the job-seekers data base
(‘Bewerberangebotsdatei’, BewA), an adjusted version of this data set for statistical purposes (ST4)
and the particular information of subsidised employment programmes (ST11TN). For this reason, the
MTG contains a large number of attributes to describe individual aspects on the one hand and on the
other hand provides a reasonable basis for the construction of the comparison group. The included
attributes can be split into four classes: socio-demographic and qualification information, labour
market history and particular programme information.5 The information on the comparison group is
derived from the BewA with the additional attributes of the ST4. Therefore, almost all characteristics
in the analysis for the comparison as well as for the treatment group originate from the same data
sources (see Appendix B for more details). The information is completed by a characterisation of the
regional labour market situation by a classification of similar and comparable labour office districts
(see Blien et al. (2004) and appendix C).6
5 The final version of the MTG includes information on all ALMP programmes of the FEA.
6 The value of good data is an essential building block for a valid evaluation. As for example Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith, and Todd (1998) mention, having access to a geographically-matched comparison group administered the same
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For the outcome variable we use information from the Employment Statistics Register (‘Bescha¨ftig-
tenstatistik’, BSt), which includes information on the total population of persons who are registered
in the social security system. These are employees and participants of several ALMP programmes,
but no self-employed or pensioners. We define only regular employment as a success, whereas all kinds
of subsidised employment or participations in ALMP programmes are defined as a failure. While
this definition might conflict with the institutional setting, it reflects the economic point of view to
measure the integration ability of JCS into non-subsidised employment.7 To identify spells of regular
employment without further promotion, we use the excerpted information of the final version of the
MTG on the individual’s time spent in ALMP programmes. We observe the labour market outcome for
the participating and nonparticipating group until December 2002. Our analysis in the following parts
refer to this last month of the observation period. So, all employment effects of JCS are estimated
for December 2002, that is 35 months after programmes have started. We exclude information on
participants in Berlin.8 Our final sample consists of 11,151 participants and 219,622 nonparticipants.
Previous empirical findings have shown that the effects of JCS differ with respect to region and gender
(Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen, 2004). Therefore, we separate our analysis by these characteristics,
i.e. we separately estimate the effects for men and women in East and West Germany.
4 Econometric Methodology
Estimation of treatment effects based on non-experimental data requires consideration of some iden-
tifying issues. As we want to compare participation in one specific programme with nonparticipation,
we can use the potential outcome framework with two potential outcomes Y 1 (individual receives
treatment) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment). The actually observed outcome for any
individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1i ·Di + (1 −Di) · Y 0i , where D ∈ {0, 1} is a binary treatment
indicator. The treatment effect for each individual i is the difference between her potential outcomes
∆i = Y 1i − Y 0i . Since one of the outcomes is unobservable for each individual, there is no opportu-
nity to calculate individual effects directly. Thus, we have to concentrate on population averages of
gains from treatment. A common evaluation parameter is the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT), which focusses explicitly on the effects of those for whom the programme is actually intended.
questionnaire as programme participants matters in devising effective non-experimental estimators of programme impacts.
7 Only the first programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later programmes is viewed as an outcome
of the first treatment and is defined as a failure.
8 The special situation of the labour market in the capital city requires a separate evaluation of the integration effects
of JCS into regular employment. The small number of participants aggravates the interpretation of the results.
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It is given by:
∆ATT = E(∆ | D = 1) = E(Y 1 | D = 1)− E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
Given equation (1), the problem of selection bias is straightforward to see, since the second term on
the right hand side of equation (1) is unobservable.
If the condition E(Y 0 | D = 1) = E(Y 0 | D = 0) holds, we can use the nonparticipants as an
adequate control group. However, this identifying assumption is likely to hold only in randomised
experiments. Consequently, estimating the ATT by the difference between the subpopulation means
of participants E(Y 1 | D = 1) and nonparticipants E(Y 0 | D = 0) will lead to a selection bias, which
may be caused by observable (e.g. age, skill differences) or unobservable factors (e.g. motivation). For
both cases different estimation strategies are available.9 If we are willing to assume that all relevant
attributes for selection are observable, the matching estimator is an appealing choice. It is based
on the idea that if individuals are similar conditional on all relevant variables, further differences
in the labour market outcome between participants and nonparticipants result from the programme
only.10 It is well known that matching on X can become hazardous when X is of high dimension
(‘curse of dimensionality’). To deal with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
suggest the use of balancing scores b(X), i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates X such
that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of the assignment to treatment. For
participants and nonparticipants with the same balancing score, the distributions of the covariates X
are the same, i.e. they are balanced across the groups. The propensity score P (X), i.e. the probability
of participating in a programme, is one possible balancing score. It summarises the information of
the observed covariates X into a single index function. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if
treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable given any balancing
score. Since we focus on ATT, it is sufficient to assume that (in the notation of Dawid (1979)):
Y 0 qD|P (X). (2)
Similar to randomisation in a classical experiment, matching balances the distributions of all relevant11
pre-treatment characteristics X in the treatment and comparison group, and thus achieves indepen-
dence between the potential outcomes and the assignment to treatment. Hence, if the mean exists,
E(Y 0 | P (X), D = 1) = E(Y 0 | P (X), D = 0) = E(Y 0 | P (X)) and the missing counterfactual mean
can be constructed from the outcomes of nonparticipants. In order for both sides of the equations to
9 See for example Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Angrist and Krueger (1999) or Blundell and Costa-Dias
(2002).
10 See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for a recent review regarding matching methods.
11 Relevant variables are all those covariates that jointly determine assignment to treatment and the potential outcomes.
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be well defined simultaneously for all P (X), it is usually additionally assumed that
Pr(D = 1 | X) < 1 (3)
for all X. This implies that the support of X is equal in both groups, i.e. S = Support(X|D = 1) =
Support(X|D = 0). These assumptions are sufficient for identification of (1), because the moments of
the distribution of Y 1 for the treated are directly estimable.
Several matching methods have been suggested in the literature. Good overviews can be found in
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005). The choice of the matching
method usually involves a trade-off between matching quality and variance. First, one has to decide
on how many nonparticipating individuals to match to a single treated individual. Nearest-neighbour
(NN) matching only uses the participant and its closest neighbour. Therefore it minimises the bias but
might also involve an efficiency loss, since a large number of close neigbours is disregarded. Kernel-
based matching on the other hand uses more nonparticipants for each participant thereby reducing the
variance but possibly increasing the bias. Finally, using the same nonparticipating individual more
than once (NN matching with replacement) may possibly improve the matching quality, but increases
the variance. We have also tested the sensitivity of the results with respect to different matching
methods. It turns out that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the matching estimator
and therefore we will use and present only one matching strategy, namely nearest-neighbour (NN)
matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02. (See appendix A for technical details.)
5 Empirical Impacts of Job Creation Schemes
5.1 Estimating the Propensity Score
We have estimated the propensity scores using binary logit models with participation as dependent
variable. To take account for regional heterogeneity and to allow for gender-specific interaction effects,
we have estimated separate models for men and women in East and West Germany.12 Several model
specifications have been tested for the selection of variables to be included in the model. Our final
specification contains explanatory variables like age, marital status, the number of children, nationality
and health restrictions that describe the sociodemographic background of individuals. Furthermore,
qualification is included by characteristics like professional training, the occupational group, the pro-
12 We have also estimated the propensity scores for the two regions using dummy variables for sex. However, using
the results of the two estimations ignores possible gender-specific interaction effects and the fact, that the coefficients in
the estimation differ in their significance and magnitude. This leads to a worse matching quality in the sense that the
balancing of covariates after mathing is reduced, i.e. the standardised bias (see below) is higher.
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fessional rank and work experience. The influence of the individual labour market history is given
by the unemployment duration, the number of (successless) placement propositions, the duration of
the last occupation, the last contact to the personal caseworker, whether the person is an aspirant
for vocational rehabilitation, present placement restraints due to health restrictions and information
on an ALMP participation in the past. The regional context is considered by using the classification
of the FEA for comparable labour office districts (see Appendix C). Table 1 presents the estimation
results for the participation probability in JCS for the four main groups. Additionally, the number of
observations in the four participating and nonparticipating groups are included.
It becomes obvious that allocation differs by regions. The coefficients of the sociodemographic
variables show that the participation probability of men in West Germany decreases with age, while
in East Germany older men and women are more likely to participate. This indicates the slightly
different purpose of the programmes in East and West Germany. Especially in East Germany, JCS
function as a relief for the labour market and are used as a bridge to retirement. Furthermore, it has
to be noted that German nationals are more likely to participate than foreigners. This may be due to
the fact that other measures of ALMP (e.g. language courses) are preferred for foreigners. Regardless
of region, health restrictions increase the individual participation probability. This finding indicates
an allocation according to the legal basis.
The coefficients for the qualification characteristics emphasise gender specific differences in the al-
location. A higher qualification increases the participation probability in both regions for women,
whereas the coefficients are insignificant for higher qualified men. The positive coefficients may be
seen as an indication that for higher qualified women it is even harder to return to regular employment
and so they are willing to participate in a JCS to finish unemployment. As expected, work experi-
ence reduces the participation probability of all groups. Work experience is in general an important
criterion for placement into regular employment. The finding indicates that experienced workers have
other opportunities on the labour market. Since unemployment duration is an eligibility criterion
for participation, its influence is of major importance. We included unemployment duration in three
categories, up to 13 weeks, between 13 weeks and one year, and for more than one year. As expected,
participation probability increases with unemployment duration.
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Tab. 1: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -1.1739 0.2731 -3.1254 0.4533 -5.7880 0.3659 -8.0021 0.3944
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.0599 0.0145 -0.0067 0.0235 0.0901 0.0141 0.1702 0.0136
Age(squared) 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0002
Married -0.1676 0.0612 -0.4483 0.0761 0.2683 0.0506 0.1145 0.0344
Number of children 0.0653 0.0281 -0.0183 0.0439 -0.0335 0.0266 -0.0238 0.0184
German 0.4402 0.0683 0.2825 0.1211 0.6284 0.1966 0.7082 0.2432
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.9160 0.1826 1.3404 0.2578 0.5491 0.2758 1.1375 0.2442
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8052 0.1267 0.6433 0.1978 0.4991 0.1270 0.6032 0.1242
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.1190 0.3658 1.9871 0.4246 0.5691 0.1925 0.7999 0.1954
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2757 0.1570 0.0651 0.2685 -0.0708 0.1721 -0.0725 0.1826
Other health restrictions -0.0472 0.0892 -0.0751 0.1390 -0.1918 0.0716 -0.1422 0.0608
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3364 0.0622 0.2294 0.1334 0.1015 0.0823 0.3428 0.0865
Industrial training -0.6738 0.0692 -0.0808 0.1399 -0.1777 0.0748 0.3315 0.0820
Full-time vocational school -0.7639 0.2685 -0.0734 0.2432 -0.3223 0.2594 0.8588 0.1384
Technical school -0.0987 0.1756 0.7183 0.1927 0.2227 0.1231 1.0166 0.0977
Polytechnic 0.3534 0.2009 1.4983 0.2144 -0.0135 0.2058 1.0388 0.1794
College, University 0.2399 0.1577 1.0221 0.1869 0.0810 0.1354 0.9004 0.1272
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.2222 0.0927 0.2628 0.2501 0.0092 0.0828 0.2370 0.0670
Mining, mineral extraction -0.5605 0.4657 – – -0.7494 0.5154 – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5810 0.1544 -0.1609 0.2605 -0.1954 0.0999 0.2149 0.0819
Service professions -0.3077 0.0544 0.3167 0.0995 -0.1739 0.0478 0.0127 0.0406
Other professions 0.1023 0.1533 0.3933 0.2628 -1.1891 0.2170 -1.2092 0.2860
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.5499 0.0982 -0.1637 0.1944 -0.1811 0.0597 0.0657 0.0525
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.0163 0.1152 0.1490 0.1256 0.1809 0.1067 0.2197 0.0605
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.0877 0.1536 0.5131 0.1624 -0.2838 0.1662 -0.0404 0.1215
Other -0.0112 0.0563 0.1512 0.1054 0.0345 0.0528 0.1004 0.0437
Qualification (with work experience) -0.3397 0.0745 -0.3139 0.1017 -0.2279 0.0695 -0.1175 0.0527
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0038 0.0004 -0.0028 0.0003
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.2055 0.0616 0.0698 0.0889 0.4673 0.0561 0.2509 0.0511
More than 52 weeks 0.3087 0.0678 0.0888 0.0974 0.4498 0.0599 0.1694 0.0509
Number of placement propositions 0.0494 0.0028 0.0530 0.0042 0.0610 0.0030 0.0919 0.0031
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0013 0.0125 0.0520 0.0177 -0.1204 0.0114 -0.0644 0.0085
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1533 0.1185 0.0696 0.2039 0.2958 0.0939 0.1535 0.1024
Placement restrictions -0.3396 0.0989 -0.2654 0.1546 -0.3164 0.0870 -0.3000 0.0825
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.2292 0.0801 0.5301 0.1043 0.4830 0.0628 0.5263 0.0422
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.6479 0.2286 0.4613 0.4466 0.6545 0.0893 0.5634 0.0746
Job-preparative measure -0.4764 1.0285 2.6387 0.5245 1.1431 0.4289 0.3364 0.5250
Job creation scheme 2.1463 0.0777 3.0671 0.1141 1.7272 0.0546 1.5382 0.0418
Rehabilitation measure -0.0929 0.2706 0.9368 0.3406 0.4232 0.2273 0.3780 0.2720
Regional Context Variables3
Cluster Ia – – – – -0.1040 0.1291 0.1421 0.1238
Cluster Ib – – – – -0.3077 0.1248 -0.0242 0.1210
Cluster Ic – – – – -0.2838 0.1361 -0.1841 0.1292
Cluster II -0.2225 0.0730 -0.5666 0.0960 Ref. Ref.
Cluster III -0.1841 0.0722 -0.4601 0.0917 – – – –
Cluster IV -0.0080 0.1002 -0.4530 0.1423 – – – –
Cluster V Ref. Ref. – – – –
No. of Part. 2,140 1,052 2,924 5,035
No. of Nonpart. 44,095 34,227 64,788 76,512
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Ref. denotes the reference category.
– not included in the estimation/ no observations.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 See appendix C for further information.
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The number of (successless) placement propositions is an indicator for bad labour market oppor-
tunities. The coefficient affirms allocation according to the law. A last interesting point to note is
that placement restrictions annotated by the caseworker harm the participation probability. This is
somewhat surprising, because JCS should even be offered to these groups.
The coefficients for the regional context are in reference to the labour office districts with the best (in
relation to the region) labour market environment. More severe labour market conditions correlate
with a decrease in the participation probabilities in both parts. For men in East Germany, living
in labour office districts with average labour market opportunities bears the clearest reduction of
participation probability, while analogously for West German women and men living in labour office
districts dominated by large cities with an above average unemployment shows the strongest decrease.
The better the labour market conditions in the respective labour office district, the more likely are
the unemployed persons to participate.
5.2 Matching Quality and First Results
Quality of Propensity Score Estimation and Matching Before we present the results, we first
have to check the quality of our propensity score estimation and second, the success of the matching
procedure in balancing the covariates between treatment and comparison group.
Our model specification for the propensity score estimation was based on specification tests to
identify the relevant variables.13 One simple method to validate the ability of a good prediction is
the computation of hit-rates, i.e. the proportion of persons with a correct prediction of their status
(participation and nonparticipation). As becomes obvious from table 2, these hit-rates lie between 70.6
percent for men and 75.7 percent for women in West Germany. For East Germany, the hit-rates are
74.2 for men and 72.2 percent for women. This implies a quite accurate underlying model. However,
the aim of propensity score matching is not to maximise the hit-rate, but to balance the covariates
between treatment and comparison groups. Since we do not condition directly on all covariates
but on the propensity score, we have to check the ability of the matching procedure to balance the
relevant covariates. We do so by comparing the absolute bias between the respective participating
and nonparticipating groups before and after matching took place. One suitable indicator to assess
the distance in the marginal distributions of the X-variables is the standardised bias (SB) suggested
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For each covariate X it is defined as a percentage of the quotient
between the difference of the sample means in the treated and (matched) comparison subsamples
13 See Caliendo (2005) for an overview regarding such specification tests and other issues concerning the implementation
of matching estimators.
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and the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups. The SB before and after
matching are given by
SBbefore = 100 · (X1−X0)√0.5·(V1(X)+V0(X)) , SBafter = 100 ·
(X1M−X0M )√
0.5·(V1M (X)+V0M (X))
, (4)
where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group before matching and X0 (V0) the analogue
for the comparison group. X1M (V1M ), X0M (V0M ) are the corresponding values after matching. This
is a common approach used in many evaluation studies, e.g. by Sianesi (2004). To abbreviate the
documentation, we present only the means of the SB before and after matching for the four main
groups (Table 2). While the mean SB lies between 10.83 and 14.62 percent before matching, it
reduces to 1.60 to 3.20 percent after matching.
Tab. 2: Some Quality Indicators
West Germany East-Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before Matching
Observations1 46,235 35,271 67,712 81,505
Hit-Rate2 70.6 75.7 74.2 72.2
Pseudo R2 0.1389 0.1775 0.1225 0.1144
F -Test 2,406.8 (41) 1,679.4 (40) 2,951.3 (41) 4,323.3 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)3 14.62 16.08 12.01 10.83
After Matching
Observations4 4,246 1,960 5,846 10,054
Pseudo-R2 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.003
F -Test 38.0 (41) 23.4 (40) 35.3 (41) 39.2 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)3 2.51 3.20 1.78 1.60
1 Observations are the sum of participating and nonparticipating individuals.
2 Hit-rates are computed as follows: If the estimated propensity score is larger than the sample proportion of
persons taking treatment, i.e. Pˆ (X) > P¯ , observations are classified as ‘1’. If Pˆ (X) ≤ P¯ observations are
classified as ‘0’.
3 Mean of Standardised Bias calculated as mean of the single characteristics’ standardised biases.
4 Since we apply NN-matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02 the number of treated individuals is
reduced after matching by observations off support. The numbers of the treated individuals can be calculated
by dividing the number of observations by 2.
Sianesi (2004) additionally suggests to re-estimate the propensity score on the matched sample, that
is only on participants and matched nonparticipants and compare the pseudo-R2’s before and after
matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors X explain the participation probability.
After matching there should be no systematic differences in the distribution of the covariates between
both groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching should be fairly low. As the results from Table
2 show, this is true for our estimation. The results of the F -tests (with degrees of freedom in brackets)
point in the same direction indicating a joint influence before, and no joint influence after matching.
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First Results All estimated effects in the later sections of this paper correspond to December
2002, the last month of our observation period. We are aware of the fact that consideration of only
this month bears some shortcomings for a valuable interpretation of the programme effects. Since
December 2002 is almost three years after programmes have started, and with respect to the average
duration of programmes of twelve months for the majority of participants almost two years after the
programmes have ended, there may be other events influencing the labour market status of participants
and nonparticipants at that time. As we do not consider further participation and assignment to other
ALMP programmes explicitly in our estimation, possible influences have to be mentioned. Apart from
that criticism, our analysis focusses on the mid-term effects of job creation schemes and therefore
requires this time horizon.
To give an idea of the time path of the effects, figure 1 presents the estimated effects for the four
main groups between February 2000 and December 2002. At the beginning of the observation period,
the programme effect is expected to be overlayed by so-called ‘locking-in’-effects (van Ours, 2004)
due to a reduced search intensity of the participants. This reduced search intensity is plausible for
participants, since they are occupied by participation and spend less time on job search. Thus, a valid
interpretation of the programme effects on the employment rates should start after the majority of
participants has left the programmes, i.e. after twelve months. Since the purpose of JCS is to stabilise
and qualify unemployed persons for the re-integration into regular employment, we would expect
increasing employment rates after the programmes have ended. We find these ‘locking-in’-effects for
all groups (see figure 1). After this initial fall there is a clear rising tendency for the groups in West
Germany and a moderate rising tendency for the groups in East Germany. For the smallest group,
women in West Germany, there is the strongest rise in the employment rates with significant positive
effects at the end of the observation period in December 2002. The effects for men in West Germany
are also rising, but the effects are insignificant in the end, i.e. an increase in the employability by
participation cannot be established. While the effects in West Germany are clearly rising, we find a
stepwise increase with relatively constant levels over one-year-periods in East Germany. Besides that,
the ‘locking-in’-effects during the first year after programmes start are not as strong as in the West.
This finding can be interpreted as an indication of worse outside options for the nonparticipants.
Although the effects show a rising tendency for all groups, a significant increase of the employment
rates due to participation can only be stated for women in West Germany, who have a significant
positive effect of 4.6 percent in December 2002. For men in West Germany we do not find any
significant effects in December 2002, whereas men in East Germany have a significant negative effect
of -2.9 percent. For women in East Germany the effect is slightly better but still significantly negative
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Fig. 1: ATT (Employment) between February 2000 and December 2002
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at -1.4 percent. So it seems that JCS rather decrease than increase the employment prospects of
participants. Of course, due to the strong ‘locking-in’-effects, the starting position for the participants
is on average lower than for nonparticipants. However, since we observe the outcomes until 35 months
after start of the programmes and almost two years after the majority of the individuals has left the
programmes, a successful programme should overcompensate for this initial fall.
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6 Targeting
Clearly, as already mentioned, one possible explanation for the discouraging results in the previous
section may be the poor quality of the programmes in conjunction with stigma- and ‘locking-in’-
effects. Another possible cause might be an inefficient allocation of participants. Since programme
effects are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and 2000), the average effects depicted in the above section
must not apply to all strata of the population. Negative mean impact results may be acceptable
if the majority of participants gains from the programme (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999).
Abandoning the ‘common effect’ assumption of treatment effects and identifying the individuals that
benefit from the programmes is an obvious opportunity to improve the future efficiency of ALMP. If we
are able to identify the individual characteristics, which are responsible for the effect heterogeneity in
individual impacts, we can use this knowledge to suggest allocation rules for a better future allotment
of programme participants.
The potential improvement of allocation mechanisms is a much discussed topic in the recent evalu-
ation literature (see for example Lechner and Smith (2005), Fro¨lich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003) and
Fro¨lich (2001)). An optimal allocation should guarantee the best results according to the underlying
programme goal, where two goals - efficiency and equity - can be distinguished. If the goal is effi-
ciency, programmes target at the maximisation of the impacts of the outcome of interest. If the goal
is equity, treatment is administered to those individuals identified as ‘neediest’, i.e. for example those
individuals with the lowest predicted re-employment probabilities (Plesca and Smith, 2002). Fro¨lich,
Lechner, and Steiger (2003) distinguish between statistical and non-statistical allocation mechanisms.
Caseworker discretion is the most common non-statistical allocation mechanism. Potential pro-
gramme participants are interviewed by their personal caseworker and allocation to programmes de-
pends on the caseworker’s evaluation of the unemployed person’s capabilities, the individual’s interests
and the availability of slots in the particular programmes. The crucial feature of the caseworker allo-
cation mechanism for an optimal allocation of unemployed persons to programmes is the knowledge
of the characteristics of the unemployed person, the situation on the local labour market and the pro-
gramme providers as well as the professional expertise of the caseworker (Lechner and Smith, 2005).
There are only a few studies that examine the quality of caseworker allocation in Europe. Fro¨lich
(2001) analyses the effects of caseworker allocation in Sweden; Lechner and Smith (2005) and Fro¨lich,
Lechner, and Steiger (2003) evaluate the effectiveness of Swiss caseworkers in comparison to a simu-
lated targeting system. The results indicate that caseworker allocation lacks the ability to achieve the
expected programme goals. Reasons for the ineffectiveness of the caseworker allocation may be lack
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of knowledge of caseworkers regarding the effectiveness of certain programmes. Caseworkers have to
build expectations about impacts of programmes on a very uncertain basis. Additionally, the broad
variety of available programmes makes it difficult to select an optimal strategy for a specific person
(Fro¨lich, Lechner, and Steiger, 2003). Another issue concerns possible ‘cream-skimming’. The experi-
ences from the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) showed that tying the funding to the performance
of local programmes as measured by job placement rates creates the incentive to serve the most able
applicants, without regarding how much different groups might have benefited from programmes (see
for example Bell and Orr (2002)).
Statistical allocation mechanisms avoid these possible problems by relying on some model indicat-
ing the individual gains of participation in a specific programme. Up to now, there is no consistent
classification of statistical treatment rules. OECD (2002) defines ‘profiling’ as ‘a procedure where
a numerical score, calculated on the basis of multivariate information, determines the referral of a
job-seeker to further employment services’. Based on this definition, we will present three approaches
to identify potential sources of effect heterogeneity, which could be used, if successful, for a better
targeting in future. At first, we will select target groups with disadvantages on the labour market, e.g.
long-term unemployed persons. In a second step, we will use these definitions and build a simple index
that we call ‘target score’. The target score simply sums up the number of individual disadvantages.
If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged on the labour market, we would
expect higher impacts for persons with higher target scores. For the evaluation of the effects in the
target groups and for the target scores, we estimate separate propensity scores for each group and
category considered.14 Finally, we test whether the effects differ corresponding to different participa-
tion probabilities. To do so, we stratify our sample in 20 sub-samples along the propensity score of
the participants and use a stratification matching estimator.
6.1 Effects for Selected Target Groups
Identifying groups of participants who benefit from programmes is a central purpose of programme
evaluation. Recent evaluation studies of JCS in Germany (Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen, 2004) and
experiences from abroad (Martin and Grubb, 2001) recommend a tighter targeting of programmes to
individuals with disadvantages on the labour market. Selecting persons that are supposed to have a
below average employability is a sensible first approach to identify possible effect heterogeneity due
to personal characteristics. Several groups of individuals who should be promoted predominantly
14 The results of these estimations and the standardised biases before and after matching are available on request by
the authors.
16
are defined in Social Code III. These are long-term unemployed persons, individuals with health
restrictions or persons who aspire for vocational rehabilitation.15 Further target groups are young ond
older unemployed as well as workers without any professional training. In addition, JCS should be
particularly applied to individuals with special placement restrictions.
Our selection is oriented on these legal definitions. We estimate the effects for participants younger
than 25 years and for participants older than 50 years respectively. Further groups are long-term
(more than one year when programmes start) unemployed persons, individuals with special placement
restrictions due to health restrictions and aspirants for vocational rehabilitation. Additionally, we
select four groups of persons who are hard-to-place. The first group contains individuals with more
than five (unsuccessful) placement propositions by the local labour offices, the second group are persons
who have already participated in an ALMP programme before unemployment. Group three contains
individuals without professional training and the last group are people without any work experience.
Table 3 contains the shares of individuals in each of the selected groups differentiated by treatment
status. For most of the groups, the results show significant differences of the shares between treatment
and comparison group. Thus, one can assume that these characteristics affect the allocation decision
to some extent. Surprisingly, long-term unemployment (more than 52 weeks) which is expected to
be an important selection criterion (in accordance to the law), differs only for men in East Germany.
Additionally, the shares of aspirants for vocational rehabilitation of this group and the proportions of
men and women without work experience in the region are approximately equal for participants and
nonparticipants. This shows once again the different purpose of JCS in East and West Germany.
Further notable findings are the different proportions of participants between the regions. While the
share of younger unemployed (below 25 years) in West Germany is clearly larger in the participants’
group, the situation in East Germany is the other way round. Older unemployed are more likely
to participate here. These differences have to be interpreted in light of the different labour market
situation in East and West Germany and the consequently different purpose of JCS in both regions.
Placing a larger share of young unemployed into programmes in West Germany complies to the law
that postulates stabilising efforts for later re-integration. In East Germany, JCS are used to relieve
the labour market and therefore older unemployed are more likely to participate than younger ones.
Besides the age differences, it has to be mentioned that persons with a larger number of place-
ment propositions or who have participated in an ALMP programme before unemployment are more
frequent in the participating group. This agrees with the expectation as the number of successless
15 This are especially persons who are no more able to work in their profession due to health restrictions, and therefore
should receive a promotion for vocational rehabilitation.
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Tab. 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Target Groups (Par-
ticipants and NonParticipants)
West Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent1
Age < 25 years 21.40 9.30 17.30 7.14
Age > 50 years 16.12 37.27 15.30 35.21
Without professional training 62.62 49.12 45.25 49.94
Without work experience 12.76 7.44 15.11 7.44
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)2 39.16∗ 40.79∗ 39.16∗ 42.16∗
More than 5 placement propositions 49.21 21.21 42.49 17.05
Vocational rehabilitation3 5.19 6.27 4.18 3.11
Placement restrictions4 16.54 21.58 14.07 17.51
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 28.55 10.05 33.17 8.86
East Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent1
Age < 25 years 8.21 13.49 2.94 6.36
Age > 50 years 38.06 31.05 30.69 35.71
Without professional training 28.63 23.10 22.26 25.85
Without work experience 10.02∗ 10.84∗ 9.89∗ 10.38∗
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)2 37.55 30.75 49.45 48.89
More than 5 placement propositions 41.24 17.87 37.28 15.32
Vocational rehabilitation3 7.46∗ 7.48∗ 3.10 4.60
Placement restrictions4 13.47 16.16 7.47 11.92
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 47.16 17.08 57.28 27.85
∗ Denotes approximate equality of shares between treatment and comparison group (5% signif-
icance level).
1 Shares are computed with respect to the number of participating/nonparticipating individuals
in the according main group.
2 Unemployment duration for participants and nonparticipants at end of January 2000.
3 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to
be qualified for a new profession.
4 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the
job-seeker reduce the number the job opportunities.
placement propositions directly indicates the placement difficulties. Furthermore, earlier participation
may identify to so-called ‘programme careerists’, who are assigned to ALMP programmes subsequently,
interrupted by unemployment spells only.
Table 4 presents the employment effects in December 2002 for these nine groups with further dis-
tinction for gender and region as above. It becomes obvious that programme effects are heterogeneous
across the selected groups. Whereas the results for the four main groups showed insignificant ef-
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fects for men in West Germany, men and women in East Germany suffered from participation and
women in West Germany benefited on average from programmes. Consideration of the effects for
the selected groups of male participants in West Germany shows, that the effects are for almost all
groups insignificant, too, but with one exception. The group of long-term unemployed men benefits
from participation and has an employment rate which is 5.03 percent higher compared to the rate of
matched nonparticipants in December 2002. The female counterparts in that region are the only group
who benefited on average from participation. With regard to the results in table 4, it becomes clear
that this finding does not hold for all groups. While three groups clearly gain from participation, i.e.
older unemployed (12.67 percent), long-term unemployed (11.25 percent), and hard-to-place women
indicated by the number of placement propositions (7.79 percent), the others do not experience any
enhancement of the employability. Anyhow, the three significant effects are above the effects for the
whole sample of females in West Germany.
Turning to the estimates for the East German groups reveals a quite similar picture. Again, most
of the estimates are statistically insignificant and participants do neither suffer nor benefit form par-
ticipation at all in December 2002. Whereas the results for men in this region have been significantly
negative on average, this finding is confirmed by the result of one group only, namely participants
who have participated in an ALMP programme before (-3.36 percent). All other estimates do not
show significant differences to the nonparticipants’ outcomes. Regarding women, we find long-term
unemployed to benefit from participation (2.45 percent). No significant differences in the employment
rates can be established for the remaining groups.
Together with the results for the West German groups, especially long-term unemployed participants
seem to benefit from programmes (except men in East Germany). This finding is somewhat satisfactory
since JCS are especially arranged for this group. Although the effects refer to one single month only,
the results are plausible. Since occupations in JCS have to be additional in nature, i.e. they do not
compete with regular jobs to avert substitution effects, the qualifying elements for market-competitive
jobs have to be assumed to be negligible. Thus, the stabilising elements in the design of JCS (to keep
in touch with the labour market) may be more important for this group. Furthermore, participation
in JCS comes along with a stigmatisation of the participant if potential employers suspect a reduced
productivity. However, long-term unemployment is a stigma itself and hence the additional stigma-
effect of JCS might be of minor importance. To the contrary, for these groups participation must be
seen as an indicator for individual motivation to change the personal situation. Hence, the stigma-
effect of JCS may be more important for short-term unemployed and younger persons.
Summarising the findings for the selected target groups leads us to three recommendations. First,
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Tab. 4: Effects for Selected Target Groups in December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Group Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0276 0.0326 440 -0.0679 0.0573 161
Age > 50 years 0.0262 0.0241 344 0.1267 0.0562 159
Without professional training -0.0046 0.0169 1,323 0.0425 0.0297 451
Without work experience -0.0040 0.0414 256 -0.0703 0.0595 128
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) 0.0503 0.0169 832 0.1125 0.0326 403
More than 5 placement propositions 0.0300 0.0176 1,039 0.0779 0.0302 400
Vocational rehabilitation1 0.0300 0.0603 106 0.0571 0.0845 36
Placement restrictions2 0.0153 0.0287 335 0.1026 0.0562 130
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0323 0.0217 594 0.0541 0.0313 279
East Germany Men Women
Group Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0437 0.0503 240 0.0278 0.0589 148
Age > 50 years -0.0130 0.0079 1,109 -0.0020 0.0093 1,529
Without professional training 0.0120 0.0161 833 -0.0215 0.0156 1,119
Without work experience 0.0069 0.0349 292 0.0225 0.0220 495
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) -0.0018 0.0093 1,097 0.0245 0.0080 2,487
More than 5 placement propositions -0.0264 0.0145 1,201 -0.0054 0.0108 1,869
Vocational rehabilitation1 -0.0140 0.0369 217 -0.0068 0.0418 154
Placement restrictions2 0.0189 0.0254 394 -0.0166 0.0217 368
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0336 0.0114 1,378 -0.0028 0.0079 2,877
Effects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and caliper of 0.02. Bold let-
ters indicate significance on a 5% level. Standard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50
replications.
1 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to be
qualified for a new profession.
2 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the
job-seeker reduce the number the job opportunities.
due to the unsatisfactory results for most of the groups where no differences in the employment rates
between participants and nonparticipants could be established, JCS have to be reviewed critically in
terms of their goals. Nevertheless, they are no complete failure for some participants as the results
especially for long-term unemployed indicate. Second, a tighter targeting of programmes to persons for
whom the possible negative aspects (like stigmatisation, lack of human capital transfer etc.) are only
of minor importance for the individual labour market prospects, should help to increase programme
efficiency. Third, since long-term unemployed persons are not the majority of unemployed in Germany,
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the number of promotions should be reduced significantly. JCS are definitely sensible for the most
disadvantaged workers, but no means for reducing unemployment permanently for all unemployed
persons.
6.2 Effects for Target Groups Using Target Scores
The results in the previous section show that JCS do not work for most of the analysed groups.
Nevertheless, as the estimates are significantly positive especially for the most disadvantaged persons,
the long-term unemployed, the question arises whether a higher number of explicit labour market
disadvantages correlates with gains from participation. To answer this question, we build a simple
index which we call ‘target score’ as the sum of the individual number of disadvantages from section 6.1.
Without any particular weighting, each disadvantage adds one point to the target score. Persons who
do not belong to any of the categories in section 6.1, have a target score of zero. The maximum level
is eight, since the categories for the age groups are mutually exclusive. For example, if an individual
is below 25 years old and has no professional training, she is assigned a target score of two. If an
individual belongs to three of the target groups, the target score is three, and so on. Due to a small
number of individuals with a target score of more than five, we summarise these persons in one group,
i.e. target score five (and more); the other categories refer to the actual number of disadvantages. We
estimate the programme effect on the employment rates in December 2002 within each category of
the target score.
If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged and if a higher target score
indicates higher need of assistance than we would expect better outcomes for higher scores. The
estimates of the effects in December 2002 are given in table 5. Ignoring the significance of the estimates
at first, the results show non-negative effects for all groups in West Germany with a target score greater
or equal three. For the lower target score groups, the picture is not that homogeneous. While men
in West Germany with a target score of one or two are harmed, women with the same score seem to
benefit. In East Germany, groups with a target score of less than three have reduced employment
rates in December 2002. For women with more disadvantages there seems to be no effect, while for
men the estimates tend to be negative except for a target score of three.
The tendencies in the results for West Germany support the hypothesis that a higher target score
coincides with a higher need of assistance and a better fit of programmes for those groups, but a clear
statement is hampered due to the insignificant estimates for most groups. It is self-evident that our
construction of the target score is very simple and is not guided by some strong theory. First, the
different targeting criteria are included with the same weights and clearly may not have the same
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Tab. 5: Estimated Effects for the Target Scores1
in December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Target-Score Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 0.0182 0.0850 55 -0.0133 0.0789 76
1 -0.0138 0.0363 295 0.0518 0.0401 208
2 -0.0180 0.0212 740 0.0316 0.0474 305
3 0.0256 0.0261 652 0.0276 0.0339 257
4 0.0199 0.0331 274 0.1176 0.0527 100
5 and more 0.1449 0.0591 84 0.0455 0.1033 32
East Germany Men Women
Target-Score Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 -0.1014 0.0484 141 -0.0812 0.0333 271
1 -0.0293 0.0198 581 -0.0064 0.0118 1,090
2 -0.0225 0.0155 937 -0.0093 0.0110 1,754
3 0.0013 0.0191 821 0.0112 0.0103 1,289
4 -0.0161 0.0213 322 0.0062 0.0159 508
5 and more -0.0532 0.0448 94 0.0000 0.0393 106
Effects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and
caliper of 0.02. Bold letters indicate significance on a 5% level. Stan-
dard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50 replications.
1 Target Scores are calculated as the sum of the number of individual
disadvantages from the selection of the target groups.
importance for the individual employability. Second, the selection of groups is incomplete. There are
other characteristics that increase or decrease the individual employability. Third, the construction of
the target score leaves room for further effect heterogeneity. The target score just notes the number
of single targets, but does not identify clear sets of disadvantages where participation improves the
employability.
Unfortunately, considering the significance of the results shows that our assumption cannot be
empirically approved. For each of the West German groups only one estimate for the higher target
scores is significant. For men with a target score of five, i.e. five or more disadvantage criteria on the
labour market, the employment rates increase by 14.49 percent after participation, for women with
a target score of four by 11.76 percent. For the other groups the estimates are insignificant, i.e. no
clear increase or decrease in the employment rates by participation can be established. The estimates
for East Germany show a slightly different picture. The results illustrate that allocating individuals
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without any of the selected targeting criteria and therefore a target score of zero to programmes,
reduces the employment rates in December 2002 by 10.14 for men and 8.12 percent for women.
Analogously to the finding for West Germany, there are no further significant results. Since our
construction of the target score is very simple, it has to be reviewed, whether incorporation of further
selection criteria and/or a different weighting of the single targets may improve the significance of the
estimates. Although the estimates are unsatisfying yet, the usage of the target score provides some
practical utility to identify possible sources for effect heterogeneity.
6.3 Targeting by Stratification Matching
The estimated propensity score reflects the individual participation probability conditional on the
relevant observable characteristics. If allocation to the programme is target-oriented, a higher partici-
pation probability should also correlate with a higher impact of treatment. Clearly, this argument only
holds, if the programmes are tailored according to the needs of the participants. If this is not the case,
i.e. if the programmes have the same effects for all participants, individuals with low participation
probabilities may benefit more since a high participation probability can to some extent be interpreted
as an indicator for bad labour market prospects. Furthermore, an interesting opportunity arises, if
the empirical evidence supports a positive relationship between a higher participation probability and
a higher impact of treatment. If this is the case, the estimated participation probability could be
used as an allocation instrument, i.e. persons with higher propensity score values should be primarily
allocated to programmes.
An intuitively appealing method to check this hypothesis is stratification matching, also known as
blocking or subclassification. The idea is to divide the sample of participants and nonparticipants
conditional on the propensity score into several strata. Within these strata, participants and non-
participants should have approximately the same probability of treatment. The average treatment
effect is estimated within each stratum as if random assignment holds. Estimation of the treatment
effect for the treated is carried out by weighting the within-strata average treatment effects by the
number of treated units. Stratification matching can be interpreted as a crude form of non-parametric
regression where the unknown function is approximated by a step function with fixed jump points (Im-
bens, 2004). An important issue in employing this estimator is to make sure that the covariates are
balanced within each stratum. The distribution among the treatment and comparison group should
be balanced, if the true propensity score is constant. Comparison of the distribution of covariates of
both groups within strata yields a possibility to assess the adequacy of the statistical model.
To check our hypothesis whether a higher participation probability correlates with a higher pro-
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gramme impact, we divide our samples into twenty subclasses each. This division is based on the
estimated propensity scores of the participants.16 Therefore, we have the same number of partici-
pants in each stratum, but different numbers of nonparticipants with approximately the same scores
as the participants. Individuals with the lowest participation probabilities are placed in stratum 1,
persons with the highest participation probabilities are placed in stratum 20. It can be seen that
this stratification leaves meaningful numbers of observations in each stratum except women in West
Germany.
The estimated treatment effects for each stratum are presented in table 6 for East Germany and in
table 7 for West Germany. The effectiveness of the programmes can be estimated by comparing the
employment rates of participants and nonparticipants in December 2002 given by E(Y1) and E(Y0) in
the tables. The average treatment effect within each stratum, i.e. the difference of the mean outcomes
of the participants and the nonparticipants is also given (∆). The last lines of the tables provide
the average treatment effect on the treated. Obviously, these effects are similar to those estimated
with the NN-matching estimators in section 5. In addition to the mean outcomes and the effects, the
tables also present the results of the hypothesis testing of equal propensity scores in the treatment
and comparison group. We tested the null hypothesis (H0) that the difference of the mean propensity
scores in both groups is zero. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (HA) imposes inequality of the
propensity score. The p-values of the HA are given in the tables; if we reject the hypothesis due to
a larger value than 0.05, we assume equality of the propensity scores and therefore balancing of the
covariates among both groups.17
The results of the hypothesis tests show that the division into twenty strata provides approximately
equal propensity scores for most groups. The equality is hampered only for the groups at the borders
of the propensity score range. For men in West Germany, strata 1, 5, 7 and 20 are imbalanced,
for women in the same region so are strata 1, 17 and 19. In East Germany the strata with lower
participation probabilities are imbalanced. For women the propensity scores are not balanced in 1
and 2, for men in 1 and 3, but also in stratum 19. Although we find significant treatment effects
for several strata, these findings do not assist our hypothesis. Taking a look at the results for East
Germany (table 6), we find that for the first four strata (except for women in stratum 1) allocation
16 Due to the large number of observations in our samples, using the whole range of the propensity scores of participants
and nonparticipants leads to a skewed stratification. Hence, we refer to the propensity scores of the participants only
to reduce this skewness. The choice of twenty strata for each of the four groups emerged from balancing tests of the
propensity score among treated and comparison persons using a smaller number of blocks.
17 We also checked the balancing property of stratification by comparing the means of the incorporated variables in the
logit models for participants and nonparticipants within each stratum as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
The results for selected variables are available on request by the authors.
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Tab. 6: Results for Stratification Matching in East Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆
1 Participants 146 0.1781 251 0.1355
Nonparticipants 16,171
0.0001
0.2366
-0.0585
18,980
0.0002
0.1221
0.0134
2 Participants 146 0.1781 252 0.1032
Nonparticipants 9,532
0.9303
0.2446
-0.0666
11,309
0.0168
0.1267
-0.0235
3 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 7,657
0.0218
0.2130
-0.0897
7,396
0.1633
0.1458
-0.0267
4 Participants 146 0.1575 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 5,529
0.3283
0.1923
-0.0347
5,641
0.1581
0.1480
-0.0568
5 Participants 147 0.0816 251 0.1633
Nonparticipants 4,432
0.0537
0.1588
-0.0772
5,098
0.2593
0.1497
0.0137
6 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1111
Nonparticipants 3,093
0.2077
0.1478
-0.0245
4,298
0.1555
0.1356
-0.0245
7 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.1627
Nonparticipants 2,727
0.9609
0.1298
-0.0476
3,852
0.5875
0.1449
0.0178
8 Participants 146 0.0685 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 2,640
0.4523
0.1182
-0.0497
2,804
0.3221
0.1566
-0.0494
9 Participants 146 0.1027 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 2,116
0.5098
0.1229
-0.0201
2,785
0.2600
0.1645
-0.0609
10 Participants 147 0.1020 252 0.0952
Nonparticipants 2,037
0.7602
0.1193
-0.0173
2,276
0.1690
0.1375
-0.0423
11 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 1,448
0.4703
0.1057
-0.0440
2,228
0.3124
0.1382
-0.0192
12 Participants 146 0.0959 252 0.1508
Nonparticipants 1,592
0.4960
0.1124
-0.0165
1,665
0.9466
0.1375
0.0133
13 Participants 146 0.0411 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 1,132
0.3424
0.1140
-0.0729
1,651
0.9627
0.1187
-0.0151
14 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1310
Nonparticipants 980
0.8348
0.0990
-0.0373
1,471
0.0541
0.0938
0.0371
15 Participants 147 0.1224 252 0.0992
Nonparticipants 948
0.7724
0.0928
0.0296
1,143
0.2967
0.0866
0.0126
16 Participants 146 0.0890 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 772
0.8285
0.0738
0.0152
1,124
0.9422
0.0907
0.0164
17 Participants 146 0.0753 251 0.0797
Nonparticipants 600
0.9521
0.0500
0.0253
910
0.3790
0.0868
-0.0071
18 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 645
0.4996
0.0419
0.0403
749
0.6872
0.1041
-0.0129
19 Participants 146 0.0548 252 0.1349
Nonparticipants 479
0.0053
0.0355
0.0193
648
0.7600
0.1157
0.0192
20 Participants 147 0.0748 252 0.1548
Nonparticipants 258
0.6655
0.0504
0.0244
442
0.6248
0.1281
0.0267
ATT: -0.0251 -0.0084
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups
are constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model
reported in Table 1.
1 TestingH0 : P (Z,D = 1)−P (Z,D = 0) = 0. CorrespondingHA: P (Z,D = 1)−P (Z,D = 0) 6= 0
in stratum.
of persons with a low participation probability has a tendential negative influence on the employment
chances in December 2002. For men in this region, this tendency is stable for participants up to
stratum 14; from stratum 15 onwards the direction of the effects changes to positive. For women
we could not establish a clear distinction, since most of the effects are insignificant. For participants
in West Germany (table 7) our hypothesis cannot be empirically approved either. One can loosely
see that higher participation probabilities correlate with higher impacts, but these findings may be
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Tab. 7: Results for Stratification Matching in West Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆
1 Participants 107 0.1869 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 14,220
0.0000
0.1105
0.0764
12,954
0.0005
0.1197
0.2649
2 Participants 107 0.1963 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 4,913
0.1905
0.2009
-0.0046
4,119
0.1774
0.2391
0.1194
3 Participants 107 0.2336 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 4,065
0.2521
0.2303
0.0034
2,754
0.5364
0.2876
0.0201
4 Participants 107 0.2150 53 0.3962
Nonparticipants 3,522
0.8130
0.2504
-0.0355
2,782
0.7943
0.2793
0.1169
5 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3019
Nonparticipants 2,403
0.0430
0.2339
0.0278
1,742
0.6186
0.3129
-0.0110
6 Participants 107 0.1682 52 0.2692
Nonparticipants 2,384
0.5197
0.2680
-0.0998
1,556
0.7633
0.3033
-0.0341
7 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 2,331
0.0045
0.2540
-0.0484
1,347
0.9023
0.3215
0.0370
8 Participants 107 0.2056 52 0.2885
Nonparticipants 1,748
0.4353
0.2649
-0.0593
1,366
0.6411
0.3192
-0.0307
9 Participants 107 0.2336 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 1,533
0.2616
0.2701
-0.0364
1,214
0.9991
0.3311
-0.0481
10 Participants 107 0.2804 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 1,229
0.3627
0.2799
0.0005
841
0.6523
0.3639
-0.0242
11 Participants 107 0.1963 52 0.3269
Nonparticipants 1,049
0.1798
0.2793
-0.0831
611
0.8903
0.3453
-0.0184
12 Participants 107 0.2991 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 929
0.5893
0.2648
0.0343
733
0.3965
0.3438
-0.0608
13 Participants 107 0.2617 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 751
0.6554
0.2690
-0.0073
623
0.2097
0.3949
-0.0102
14 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 684
0.3683
0.2529
0.0088
571
0.3294
0.3468
-0.0260
15 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.4340
Nonparticipants 661
0.5013
0.2723
-0.0667
447
0.2556
0.3154
0.1185
16 Participants 107 0.2430 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 551
0.4412
0.1978
0.0452
265
0.0935
0.2906
0.0171
17 Participants 107 0.1402 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 473
0.8646
0.1734
-0.0332
108
0.0282
0.2593
0.0615
18 Participants 107 0.1308 52 0.3654
Nonparticipants 295
0.0955
0.1186
0.0122
78
0.7560
0.1667
0.1987
19 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 191
0.4283
0.1204
0.1413
70
0.0389
0.1714
0.1682
20 Participants 107 0.2710 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 163
0.0038
0.1104
0.1606
38
0.1637
0.0870
0.2715
ATT: 0.0018 0.0565
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups
are constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model
reported in Table 1.
1 TestingH0 : P (Z,D = 1)−P (Z,D = 0) = 0. CorrespondingHA: P (Z,D = 1)−P (Z,D = 0) 6= 0
in stratum.
inconsistent as the balancing tests above show. It seems that the participation probability is no
adequate measure for effect heterogeneity here and successful integration into regular employment
depends on different compositions of the individual characteristics than selection into programmes.
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7 Conclusion
Previous empirical studies of JCS in Germany have shown that the average effects for participating
individuals are negative. Whereas this inefficiency may be due to the poor quality of programmes, it
may be also driven by an inefficient allocation of potential participants to programmes. Allocation of
individuals into programmes in Germany is accomplished by caseworker discretion. On the one hand,
a positive aspect of this mechanism is that decisions are based on personal contact. On the other
hand, since ALMP consist of very different programmes, caseworkers may lack knowledge regarding
programme impacts. Since this problem is not specific to Germany, the topic of a potential improve-
ment of allocation mechanisms has become important in recent literature. Broadly, two categories can
be distinguished: Non-statistical allocation mechanisms like caseworker discretion and statistical allo-
cation mechanisms called profiling or targeting. Since statistical allocation systems are not introduced
in the German labour market yet, there is no empirical evidence for their effectiveness.
In this paper we estimate the average treatment effects for men and women in East and West Ger-
many participating in JCS. Following that we use three strategies to identify possible effect hetero-
geneity. We use data on all participants, who started a JCS in February 2000, and on nonparticipants
from January 2000, who were eligible to participate, but did not enter those schemes in February.
The employment effects of JCS are evaluated in December 2002. The results show positive effects for
women in West Germany and negative effects for men and women in East Germany, men in West
Germany do neither suffer nor benefit from participation.
For the three approaches used to analyse effect heterogeneity, we select target groups with disadvan-
tages on the labour market oriented by the definition of the legal basis in a first step. Our findings show
that JCS do neither harm nor improve the labour market chances for most of the groups. Exceptions
are long-term unemployed men in West Germany, long-term unemployed women in both regions, older
women and women who are hard-to-place in West Germany, who benefit from participation. Given
these results and remembering that (re-)integration into regular employment is the main purpose, it
has to be recommended that JCS should be targeted to those benefiting groups and should not be used
on large scale. In a second step, we use these definitions to build up a simple indicator (target score)
as the sum of the individual number of disadvantages. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the
more disadvantaged persons on the labour market, we expect positive impacts for groups with a higher
score. Unfortunately, most of the estimates are insignificant and although the expected tendency is
observable, one has to be cautious with interpretation. Finally, we implement stratification matching
to analyse if a higher participation probability also correlates with higher impacts. No clear picture
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can be revealed. The estimated participation probability is no adequate measure for effect heterogene-
ity here and successful integration into regular employment is determined by different compositions of
the individual attributes than selection into programmes. Even though the results could not confirm
some of our hypotheses, they show that heterogeneity in treatment effects is an important topic which
has to be considered more accurately in further research. We have also shown that this might be a
way to improve efficiency of ALMP and hence to allocate scarce resources more effectively.
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A The Matching Estimator
The general form of matching estimators is given by:
∆MAT =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1
[Y 1i −
∑
j∈I0
WN0(i, j)Y
0
j ], (5)
where N0 is the number of observations in the comparison group I0 and N1 is the number of observa-
tions in the treatment group I1. We estimate the effect of treatment for each treated observation i ∈ I1
in the treatment group, by contrasting her outcome with treatment with a weighted average of com-
parison group observations j ∈ I0. Matching estimators differ in the weights attached to the members
of the comparison group (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998), where WN0(i, j) is the weight
placed on the j-th individual from the comparison group in constructing the counterfactual for the i-th
individual of the treatment group. The weights always satisfy
∑
jWN0(i, j) = 1,∀i, that is the total
weight of all comparisons sums up to one for each treated individual. Define a neighbourhood C(Pi) for
each i in the participant sample and denote as neighbours for i those nonparticipants j ∈ I0 for whom
Pj ∈ C(Pi). Individuals matched to i are those people in the set Ai where Ai = {j ∈ I0|Pj ∈ C(Pi)}.
Nearest neighbour (NN) matching sets
CNN (Pi) = min
j
‖Pi − Pj‖, j ∈ N0, (6)
where ‖(.)‖ is obtained through a distance metric. Doing so, the nonparticipant with the value of Pj
that is closest to Pi is selected as the match, therefore:
WNNN0N1(i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj‖Pi − Pj‖
0 otherwise
. (7)
Several variants of NN matching are proposed, e.g. NN matching ‘with’ and ‘without replacement’.
In the former case a nonparticipating individual can be used more than once as a match, whereas in
the latter case it is considered only once. Matching with replacement involves a trade-off between bias
and variance. If we allow replacement, the average quality of the matching will increase and the bias
will decrease. NN matching faces the risk of bad matches if the closest neighbour is far away. This
can be avoided by imposing a tolerance on the maximum distance ‖Pi − Pj‖ allowed. This form of
matching, caliper matching (Cochrane and Rubin, 1973), imposes the condition:
‖Pi − Pj‖ < ², j ∈ N0, (8)
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where ² is a pre-specified level of tolerance. The weights for caliper matching (CM) are given by:
WCM (i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj ‖Pi − Pj‖ ∧ ‖Pi − Pj‖ < ²
0 else
. (9)
Treated observations for whom no matches within the neighbourhood C(Pi) = {Pj |‖Pi−Pj‖ < ²} can
be found are excluded from the analysis. Hence, caliper matching is one form of imposing a common
support condition.
B Data Sources and Attributes
Table B.1 gives detailed information of the data sources and the included attributes. A selection of
these attributes is used to estimate the participation probability.
Tab. B.1: Data Sources and Attributes
Data Source Attributes
MTG1 BewA and ST42 a) Socio-demographic: age, gender, marital status, number
of children, nationality, health restrictions
b) Qualification: graduation, professional training, occupa-
tional group, position in last occupation, work experience, ap-
praisal of qualification by the placement officer
c) Labour market history: duration of unemployment, du-
ration of last occupation, number of job offers, occupational
rehabilitation, programme participation before unemployment
ST11TN3 d) Programme: institution that receives subsidy, activity
sector, time of qualification and/or practical training during
programme, begin and end of programme (payment of the
subsidy), entry and leave of the participant, duration of pro-
gramme
1 Programme participants master data set (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei, MTG)
2 Job-seekers data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and adjusted version for statistical pur-
poses (ST4)
3 Programme participants of subsidized employment data set (ST11TN)
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C Regional Context Variables
The classification of the labour office districts was undertaken by a project group of the FEA. The
aim of the project was to enhance the comparability of the labour office districts for a more efficient
allocation of funds. The 181 labour office districts were split into twelve types of office districts with
similar labour market circumstances. The comparability of the office districts is build upon several
labour market characteristics. The most important criteria are the underemployment quota and the
corrected population density. The underemployment quota is defined as the relation of the sum of
unemployed individuals and participants in several ALMP programmes to the sum of all employed
persons and these participants. The corrected population density is used to improve the comparability
of rural labour office districts with metropolitan and city areas. In addition to that, the vacancy
quota describing the relation of all reported vacancies at the labour office, the placement quota, that
contains the number of placements to the number of employments, and the quota of people who achieve
maintenance allowance in relation to the underemployment quota are used. Furthermore, an indicator
for the tertiarisation level built on the number of employed persons in agricultural occupations and
an indicator for the seasonal unemployment are considered.
The twelve types of comparable labour office districts can be summarised into five types for strategic
purposes. Since almost all labour office districts in East Germany belong to the first of these five
strategic types, we use the finer typing of three groups here. For West Germany we use the remaining
four types for strategic purposes. Table C.1 presents the classification used in the analysis, containing
a short description of the clusters and the number of labour offices in each clusters.
Tab. C.1: Classification of labour office districts in Germany
Cluster Description No.
Ia East German labour office districts with worst labour market conditions 5
Ib East German labour office districts with bad labour market conditions 23
Ic East German labour office districts with high unemployment 5
II Labour office districts dominated by large cities 21
III West German labour office districts with rural elements, medium-sized
industry and average unemployment
63
IV West German centers with good labour market prospects 10
V West German labour office districts with the best labour market
prospects
47
No. describes the number of labour offices in cluster.
Source: Blien et al.(2004)
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